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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GADDIS INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
A Corporation, and KEITH L. 
KNIGHT,doing business as KNIGHT 
REALTY COMPANY, Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CHARLES H. MORRISON, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 8188 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 1, 1952, the defendant, Charles H. Morrison, 
executed and delivered to the Knight Realty Company a listing 
contract for tl1e sale of his real property in Salt Lake City, 
Utah, for a period of six months from date of said listing 
contract. 
Among the provisions of this listing contract is the fol-
lowing: 
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"During the life of this contract, if you find a buyer, 
who is ready, able and willing to buy or exchange said 
property or any part thereof, at said price and terms, 
or any other price or terms, to which I may agree in 
writing, or if I agree to an exchange of said property, 
or any part thereof, or if said property or any part 
thereof is sold, or exchange during said term by myself 
or any other person, firm or corporation, I agree to pay 
you the commission recommended by the Salt Lake 
Real Estate Board for such sale or exchange; or if sold 
or exchange within three months after such expiration 
to any person, firm or corporation to whom the property 
was offered by me, or you, or any member of the 
Multiple Listing Bureau of the Salt Lake Real Estate 
Board, during the term of this listing, I agree to pay 
you the commission above stated, and in case of the 
employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms 
.of this agreement, I agree to pay a reasonable attorney's 
fee and all costs of collection." (Exhibit P-A). 
During the term of this agreement, the Gaddis Investment 
Company, one of the plaintiffs herein, who is a member of 
the Multiple Listing Board of Salt Lake City, whose right it 
was to procure a buyer for any real property listed for sale 
under the terms of the agreement of the l\1ultiple Listing 
Board with their members, procured a buyer for the property 
of the defendant, who was able, willing and ready to buy 
the property, and in accordance therewith, both the defendant, 
as Seller and one Thomas B. Allen and Mary Lee Allen, as 
the Buyers of said property executed an Earnest Money Re-
ceipt and offer to purchase on the 9th day of August, 1952 
(Exhibit P-B), and a deposit was placed by the Buyers with 
the Gaddis Investment Company, as brokc:r, to bind the deal. 
Pending the time for the final Uniform Real Estate Con-
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tract to be signed by the Seller and the Buyers, in accordance 
with the practice of closing such deals, a question arose as to 
the policy of the members of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
being a party to the sale of real estate to colored people, (the 
buyers in this case being colored people) ( T r. 48) , and ac-
cording to the evidence, the Gaddis Investment Company 
advised the Seller and the Buyers that the sale would have 
to be delayed for a short time until they could get a clearance 
with the Real Estate Board regarding the sale of real estate 
to colored people in certain restricted areas (Tr. 36 and 42). 
Pursuant to this the Buyers demanded their deposit back 
(Tr. 39), which was returned to them by the Gaddis Investment 
Co., which they were probably obligated to do, inasmuch 
as they were not satisfied with the delay, although there was 
nothing in the preliminary earnest money receipt (Exhibit 
P-B) as to the time when the contract was to be concluded. 
In the meantime, and pending the clearance of this ques-
tion with the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, which was some 
ten or fifteen days (Tr. 49) the defendant closed the deal 
(Exhibits D-4 and D-5) and sold the said property to the 
Aliens, the purchaser procured by the Gaddis Investment 
Company and then refused to pay the commission for the 
sale of the property in accordance with the listing contract 
hereinabove referred to as Exhibit P-A. This suit was then in-
stituted to recover the commission in the sum of $3 70.00 
together with attorney's fees and court costs, and after the 
close of the cv idence the court took the matter under advise-
ment and after submission of briefs by the respective counsels 
for said parties rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs 
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and against the defendant pursuant to the prayer of the com-
plaint. 
ARGUMENT 
In appellants' abstract he presents the following points 
which he contends the court erred in its decision: 
PROPOSITION L 
STATE COURTS CANNOT BE USED TO ASSIST 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS IN 
ABRIDGING THE PRIVILEGES AND IM1fUNITIES 
GUARANTEED TO CITIZENS UNDER THE 14th AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
PROPOSITION 2. 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND 
THE FACTS SPECIALLY AND STATE SEPARATELY ITS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THEREON. 
PROPOSITION 3. 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE TESTI-
MONY OF ELMER R. SMITH. 
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PROPOSITION 4. 
WHEN ONE CONTRACTOR REFUSES TO PERFORM 
ANY PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE OTHER 
MAY TREAT THE WHOLE CONTRACT AS ABAN-
DONED. 
These propositions will be taken up in their respective 
order and answered by Respondent herein. 
APPELLANT'S PROPOSITION 1. 
STATE COURTS CANNOT BE USED TO ASSIST 
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS OR INDIVIDUALS IN 
ABRIDGING THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 
GUARANTEED TO CITIZENS UNDER THE 14th AMEND-
MENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
Respondent will take very little time in arguing this ques-
tion. In the main we agree with this proposition, but take the 
stand that this proposition is not within the perview of the 
issues of this case. The court was not used in this case to assist 
private corporations or individuals in abridging the immunities 
and privileges of citizens and particularly the defendant in 
this case. The only question in this case is: Did the Appellant 
and the Respondents enter into a contract for the sale of 
realty and did the Respondents perform their obligations and 
conditions of sJ.id contract, and if so were they entitled to 
remuneration for their services, according to the conditions 
and terms of the contract? 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The question as to the purchaser of this property being 
a colored person only came into this matter incidentally and 
was not a determinable factor in the case at all. The only 
reason for a delay in closing the purchase of this property 
on the part of the Respondents was that Respondents had to 
clear themselves with the rules and regulations of the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board without involving themselves, with 
respect to consummating sales of real property to people not 
of the Caucasian race and unless this delay had something to 
do with the violation of the listing contract on the part of 
the Respondents, it has no place in this matter. 
Respondents have no arguments against the authorities 
cited by Appellant but contend they are beside the point and 
not applicable to the determination of the issues in this case, 
and for that reason we will not attempt to go into this question 
further. 
Counsel for Appellant has attempted to show that because 
there was a restrictive covenant in the abstract of title to this 
property attempting to restrict the sale of said property to 
colored people that that was the reason the Respondents 
would not go through with the sale, but this was positively 
denied by Respondents (Tr. 3 7 and 50 )._and there is no other 
evidence in this case supporting this proposition. The sale 
was consummated and the property was sold to the buyers, 
who were colored people, procured by the Respondents. We 
do not desire to elaborate on this proposition further for 
the reasons hereinabove stated. 
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APPELLANT'S PROPOSITION II 
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE TRIAL COURT TO FIND 
THE FACTS SPECIALLY AND STATE SEPARATELY ITS 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW THEREON. 
It is difficult for Respondents to see why the Appellant 
raises any issue with relation to his Proposition 2. We refer 
the court to. the findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
judgment signed by the lower court as reflected by the record 
at pages 95-96-97. The contents thereof were what the court 
found and reached its conclusions of law and judgment based 
upon the evidence submitted in this case. We assume that Ap-
pellant is of the opinion that the court should have considered 
his Proposition 1 in this case and made findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment in accordance with that ques-
tion, but it is the contention of Respondents that the court 
did not consider that proposition as bearing upon the issues 
in this case and hence did not make any findings of fact or 
conclusions of law with relation thereto, because this propo-
sition was not part of the case, but, at most, was only incidental 
thereto in the evidence, and was not part of the question 
as to whether the Respondents performed their part of the 
listing contract and rendered the services in accordance there-
with to the Appellant. 
We have no dispute with the law cited in this proposition 
by Appellant, but say that it is beside the point. The findings 
of fact and conclusions of law and the judgment entered by 
the lower court was entirdy what the court found pursuant 
to the evidence and entered in accordance therewith. The court 
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ordered that plaintiff be awarded judgment as prayed (R. 94). 
We think we need go no further into this proposition. 
APPELLANT'S PROPOSITION III 
THE COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING THE TESTI-
MONY OF ELMER R. SMITH. 
Appellant called as his witness a Mr. Elmer R. Smith, 
(Tr. 81-82) who stated his name was Elmer R. Smith and was 
associate professor of anthropology at the University of Utah, 
and pursuant thereto the court said: 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. I don't see that this 
is going to have anything to do with this case, is it? 
I don't want to get into any racial anthropology here. 
I treat colored people just like I do whites. 
MR. OLIVER: My purpose, your honor, for calling 
this witness is to show as a matter of fact that this 
type of lawsuit will have social reaction in the com-
munity designed to foster and encourage restrictive 
covenants and that the court as such has no authority, 
power to lend its aid in that direction. 
THE COURT: You don't need to quote me an anthro-
pologist on that. You can quote law by the Supreme 
Court of the United States. 
MR. OLIVER: I am calling Professor Smith as social-
ist, and I will qualify him. 
THE COURT: I don't need to hear it. The Supreme 
Court of the United States has spoken on that. I don't 
have any power to aid or assist those people who enter 
into these covenants. I think that is rather clear in the 
law. 
10 
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MR. OLIVER: My point is this, that a judgment 
in favor of plaintiff in this case will do just that, and 
that is what I am calling this particular witness for. 
THE COURT: I don't want to hear it. I don't think I 
need that. You can excuse Mr. Smith. 
Respondent assumes the foregoing discussion between 
counsel for Appellant and the Court, that Appellant wanted 
to go into the sociological question of the differences in races, 
which the court concluded was not a part of the issues of this 
case, and supports the contention of Respondents as argued 
hereinabove as to Appellant's Proposition 1. This clearly 
shows that the court did not take into consideration this ques-
tion in determining the issues of this case, but treated it as 
one of purely contractual relations and whether Respondents 
performed under the terms of the listing contract, hence no 
necessity of findings of fact and conclusions of law with relation 
to the sociological proposition that Appellant has endeavored 
to introduce in this case. We think this needs no further argu-
ment. 
APPELLANT'S PROPOSITION IV. 
WHEN ONE CONTRACTOR REFUSES TO PERFORM 
ANY PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT, THE OTHER 
MAY TREAT THE WHOLE CONTRACT AS ABAN-
DONED. 
The two cases cited by Appellant in support of this propo-
sition are not in point with the question raised in this case 
now before the court. In each of these cases, (Appellant's 
Brief, page 23) there was a failure on the part of the plaintiff 
11 
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to perform the conditions and terms of their respective con-
tracts, according to the facts in each case. In the Torrey vs. 
Shea case, 155 P. 829, the plaintiff failed to deliver the mer-
chandise ordered by the defendant in the second year of his 
contract and hence breached his contract and the defendant 
candled his contract. 
In the Chaffee vs. Widman case, 108 P. 995 the broker 
failed to follow through with his agreement and abandoned 
the contract and did nothing to further his agreement, which 
was not in force at the time the defendant therein completed 
his deal with the buyer. He did not procure a purchaser that 
was able and willing to perform, but had abandoned the con-
tract. Plaintiff brought his action on an entirely different 
theory which the court held he could not recover. The facts 
of these cases are not applicable to the facts in the instant case. 
The only questions involved in the instant case, according 
to Respondents' contention, are as follows: 
(a) Did the Respondents and Appellants enter into 
a bona fide listing contract for the sale of Appel-
lant's real property ? 
(b) Did the Respondents procure a Buyer who was 
able, ready and willing to buy the Appellant's 
property? 
(c) Was the sale consummated with the Buyer pro-
cured by the Respondent? 
(d) Was the listing contract in force at the time of 
the consummation of the sale of Appellant's 
property? 
Answering and disposing of questions (a) and (d), we 
refer to Exhibit P-A in which there is no dispute as to the con-
12 
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tract and the terms thereof. The contract was for a period of 
six months from the date thereof, to-wit: August 1, 1952. 
Exhibit D-5 is a Uniform Real Estate Contract executed by 
appellant and wife as Sellers and Thomas Allen and Mary 
Bell Allen, his wife, as Buyers and dated August 25, 1952, 
which was well within the six months period of the listing 
contract although it was consummated by the Appellant and the 
Buyers, but the sale was made to the Buyers who were produced 
by the Respondents and in accordance with the terms of the list-
ing contract, Exhibit P-A the Appellant was obligated to pay 
the commission. Said terms being as follows: 
"or if said property of any part thereof is sold, or 
exchanged during said term by myself or any other per-
son, firm or corporation, I agree to pay you the com-
mission recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate 
Board for such sale or exchange;" etc. 
In support of the questiones (b) and (c), it is the con-
tention of the Respondents that the Respondents did procure 
a buyer who was able, ready and willing to buy, and did buy. 
The Contract Exhibit P-B discloses that the Buyers signed and 
the Seller also signed and accepted. There was some delay 
between the time Exhibit P-B was signed and Exhibit D-5 was 
signed, due to a clearance to be obtained by Respondents as 
outlined hereinabove. But the fact of the matter is the Appel-
lant did not lose his sale for the reason that he closed the sale 
himself. He sold to the party whom the Respondent had 
procured for him, and the Respondent had done everything 
required of the Respondents up to the point of holding the 
matter up for a clearance. The holding of the matter up did 
not lose the sale, because the sale was consummated between 
13 
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the Appellant and the Buyers whom the Respondents had 
procured for the Appellant. If Appellant had lost the sale 
because of the delay in procuring the clearance then there 
would have been no question that Respondents would not be 
entitled to a commission. The delay was not because of any 
voluntary or malicious act on the part of the Respondents. 
It was done as a precaution, for the broker's protection and 
was not a voluntary or involuntary act on the part of the Re-
spondent, and for that reason we say there was no abandonment 
of the contract or the services of the Respondent (Tr. 55-56-
57-58-59-61-62-63-64) nor was the listing cancelled because 
of the delay or otherwise as will appear by the testimony of 
Mr. W aldis, an agent of the Knight Realty Company herein-
above referred to in the transcript. 
If the sale had been lost because of the conduct of the 
broker and the Appellant had to sell at a later time or had 
sustained damages otherwise, the Appellant probably could 
have sued the Respondents for damages. But the sale was not 
lost, and the Appellant got out of his sale all that he bargained 
for, and should pay the commission. 
At no time did the Appellant revoke the authority of the 
Respondents, nor did the Respondents at any time terminate 
or abandon the contract and the same was in full force and 
effect at the time the sale was made by the Appellant to the 
party procured by the Respondents. 
Let us examine some law with relation to such listing 
contracts and services of brokers to Sellers: 
C. J. S. Vol. 12, page 150, Par. 66. 
14 
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"Conversely, the owner cannot defeat the right of 
the broker to a commission or other compensation by 
terminating the agency after the broker has procured 
a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the property 
on the terms suggested by the owner and has com-
municated that fact to the owner. This is especially true 
where the principal eventually sells his property to 
such a person." 
C. ]. S. Vol. 12, page 186, Par. 84. 
"In many cases however, the broker's right to a com-
mission depends on the ultimate completion or final 
consummation of the deal or transaction which he was 
employed to negotiate." 
117 Pac. 575, Calif. Justy et al vs. Erro. Calif. 
"Nor is it necessary that the broker should personally 
have conducted the negotiations between his principal 
and the purchaser leading to the sale, nor that he should 
have been present when the bargain was completed, or 
even that the principal should have at the time known 
that the purchaser was one found by the broker. Sec-
tion 966, Mecham on Agency, and cases cited in the 
foot note thereof. And, while it is indispensable, 
yet it is sufficient that his efforts was the procuring 
cause of the sale; that, through his agency, the pur-
chaser was brought into communication with the seller, 
although the parties negotiated in person." 
Peterson vs. Shannon, 1 Pac. 2d 630. Idaho. 
"After a broker has found a customer and com-
menced negotiations, neither the principal nor the 
customer can break them off and defeat the broker's 
right to a commission by concluding the transaction 
without his aid. Nor can a principal reject an offer 
made by a person found by a broker and then without 
the broker's intervention sell to the same person and 
15 
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thus defeat the broker's right to a commission. A broker 
is entitled to a commission for effecting a sale, although 
he takes no part in the negotiations, where the sale is 
effected as a result of his introducing the customer and 
the principal or of his putting them into communica-
tion; the principal cannot defeat the right to compen-
sation by closing the transaction directly with the custo-
mer without the broker's further aid." 
C. J. S. Vol. 12, page 212, Par. 91. 
"Where the parties are brought together as a result 
of the broker's efforts, and a sale, lease, or exchange 
results, the broker becomes entitled to a commission, 
although he is not present during or takes no part in 
the negotiations between the parties or the closing of 
the bargain. 
Byrd vs. Bruce-Jones Live Stock Commission. 266 Pac. 
743, Kansas. 
"There appears no question but that the defendant 
received the benefit of the efforts of the plaintiff in 
complying with his contractual obligations. A reasonable 
conclusoin follows that the plaintiff is entitled to his 
commission on the cattle in question." 
We do not deem it necessary to quote further from 
authorities with respect to the foregoing, as this seems too 
elementary and many more decisions to this effect could be 
quoted, but we supply the foregoing in support of our conten-
tion that although there may have been delay on the part of 
the Respondents in this action in getting this sale completed, 
(which, however, was done in good faith by the Respondents), 
the sale did go through, and the defendant did receive the 
benefit of the efforts of the Respondents as stated in the Kan-
16 
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sas case, supra, with the party whom the Respondents did pro-
duce, and to deprive the Respondents of their commission 
would be an unjust enrichment for the defendant. 
The sale was made within the time provided by the listing 
contract. There had been no cancellation or revocation or 
abandonment of this agreement on the part of the Respondents 
with the Appellant as revealed by the evidence. 
In conclusion we refer the court to the following authority 
which seems to be directly in point and in support of Respond-
ents' contention, to-wit: 
C. J. S. Vol. 12, page 207-8, Par. 91. 
"Provided the case is not taken out of the rule by 
the terms of the contract of employment, such contract 
is complied with in other respects, and the principal 
has not put himself in a position where it is improper 
for him to raise the question of procuring cause, it 
is necessary and sufficient to entitled a broker to a 
commission, that he be the efficient, procuring, or in-
ducing cause of the sale or other transaction be the 
direct and proximate result of his efforts or services. 
In view of the foregoing we respectfully submit that the 
judgment of the lower court in this matter should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BENJAMIN SPENCE, 
Attorney for Respondents 
17 
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